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Much honored Colleague:

Your kind and full letter of 15th Feb.^y I have received with lively satisfaction. I am gratified at finding that the matter in our pamphlet on "The Conception of God" interests you, and interests you for the reasons that you name.

I cannot say exactly how much space my projected essay on "Kant's Reply to Hume" would take up in your journal. It is not written. But I should say, for a good conjecture, that 20 pages of the size used in Schurman's Philosophical Review would be

sufficient to contain what I have to say on that subject.

I did not keep a copy of my letter to you of 10. January, and so I cannot now remember just what subjects I proposed to treat. I had forgotten that I mentioned this one about Kant's Reply to Hume, - at least, in any prominent manner. I was thinking more of other matters. But this subject is very interesting and very important, and as I have well-defined views upon it I shall be glad to state them in your journal at some future time, if you incline to have me do so.

I am more deeply interested, however, in the matter which I have hinted at in the last division (VIII) of my criticism of Prof. Royce, contained in "The Conception of God". That, I believe, will mark a new departure in philosophy, if it is once clearly and properly expounded and supported.

You say, however, that you do not understand what I refer to, when I speak about a "criticism of Kant's attempted Vindication of Science against the assault of Hume, which I indicated in my part of the pamphlet, etc."

What I mean is pretty clearly hinted at, in this same division VIII of my remarks. If I have not used Hume's name, I plainly allude to him. Hume, of course, had declared that a predictive science of Nature, as based upon the idea of a necessary connection between real things, was philosophically impossible. Kant undertook to show, in reply, how (quomodo) such a nature-knowledge was possible. I mean to show, that Kant did not succeed in doing this; — he, indeed, did take a long step on the right path, but stopped short of its end. He supposes he can show the possibility of a priori objective certainty by the use of Space & Time & Categories (i.e., by the use of schematized Categories), and by means of these alone, without having to appeal to what he calls "Practical Reasons." I